Entry and R & D in procurement contracting
| ISSN: |
0022-0531
|
|---|---|
| Source: |
Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002
|
| Topics: |
Economics
|
| Type of Medium: |
Electronic Resource
|
| URL: |
| _version_ | 1798290957825736704 |
|---|---|
| autor | Tan, G. |
| autorsonst | Tan, G. |
| book_url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90100-V |
| datenlieferant | nat_lic_papers |
| fussnote | A model of competitive procurement and contracting is presented in this paper. The key features of the model include precontract R & D, an endogenous number of homogeneous firms, and sealed-bid auction rules. Both diminishing and constant returns to scale (DRS and CRS) in R & D expenditure technologies are considered. I find that the sealed-bid first-price auction (FPA) is equivalent to the second-price auction (SPA) under DRS technology. The Revenue Equivalence Theorems breaks down under CRS because multiple equilibria arise in the R & D stage when SPA is used. Howerer, SPA yields a unique perfect equilibrium given sufficient heterogeneity among potential firms. The free-entry perfect equilibrium is also characterized. The buyer prefers free entry through an appropriate selection of the reservation price. |
| hauptsatz | hsatz_simple |
| identnr | NLZ184779065 |
| iqvoc_descriptor_title | iqvoc_00000149:procurement |
| issn | 0022-0531 |
| journal_name | Journal of Economic Theory |
| materialart | 1 |
| package_name | Elsevier |
| publikationsort | Amsterdam |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| reference | 58 (1992), S. 41-60 |
| search_space | articles |
| shingle_author_1 | Tan, G. |
| shingle_author_2 | Tan, G. |
| shingle_author_3 | Tan, G. |
| shingle_author_4 | Tan, G. |
| shingle_catch_all_1 | Tan, G. Entry and R & D in procurement contracting 0022-0531 00220531 Elsevier |
| shingle_catch_all_2 | Tan, G. Entry and R & D in procurement contracting 0022-0531 00220531 Elsevier |
| shingle_catch_all_3 | Tan, G. Entry and R & D in procurement contracting 0022-0531 00220531 Elsevier |
| shingle_catch_all_4 | Tan, G. Entry and R & D in procurement contracting 0022-0531 00220531 Elsevier |
| shingle_title_1 | Entry and R & D in procurement contracting |
| shingle_title_2 | Entry and R & D in procurement contracting |
| shingle_title_3 | Entry and R & D in procurement contracting |
| shingle_title_4 | Entry and R & D in procurement contracting |
| sigel_instance_filter | dkfz geomar wilbert ipn albert fhp |
| source_archive | Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 |
| timestamp | 2024-05-06T08:24:59.374Z |
| titel | Entry and R & D in procurement contracting |
| titel_suche | Entry and R & D in procurement contracting A model of competitive procurement and contracting is presented in this paper. The key features of the model include precontract R & D, an endogenous number of homogeneous firms, and sealed-bid auction rules. Both diminishing and constant returns to scale (DRS and CRS) in R & D expenditure technologies are considered. I find that the sealed-bid first-price auction (FPA) is equivalent to the second-price auction (SPA) under DRS technology. The Revenue Equivalence Theorems breaks down under CRS because multiple equilibria arise in the R & D stage when SPA is used. Howerer, SPA yields a unique perfect equilibrium given sufficient heterogeneity among potential firms. The free-entry perfect equilibrium is also characterized. The buyer prefers free entry through an appropriate selection of the reservation price. |
| topic | Q |
| uid | nat_lic_papers_NLZ184779065 |