Search Results - (Author, Cooperation:J. Scheffran)

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  1. 1
    J. Scheffran ; M. Brzoska ; J. Kominek ; P. M. Link ; J. Schilling
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Published 2012
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    Publication Date:
    2012-05-19
    Publisher:
    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Print ISSN:
    0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN:
    1095-9203
    Topics:
    Biology
    Chemistry and Pharmacology
    Computer Science
    Medicine
    Natural Sciences in General
    Physics
    Keywords:
    Aggression ; *Climate Change ; *Conflict (Psychology) ; Conservation of Natural Resources ; Data Collection ; Databases, Factual ; Humans ; Politics ; Socioeconomic Factors ; *Violence
    Published by:
    Latest Papers from Table of Contents or Articles in Press
  2. 2
    M. Brzoska ; J. Scheffran
    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
    Published 2013
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    Publication Date:
    2013-06-15
    Publisher:
    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
    Print ISSN:
    0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN:
    1476-4687
    Topics:
    Biology
    Chemistry and Pharmacology
    Medicine
    Natural Sciences in General
    Physics
    Keywords:
    Climate Change/*statistics & numerical data ; *Conflict (Psychology) ; *Research Personnel ; *Warfare
    Published by:
    Latest Papers from Table of Contents or Articles in Press
  3. 3
    Jathe, M. ; Krabs, W. ; Scheffran, J.

    Chichester, West Sussex : Wiley-Blackwell
    Published 1997
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    ISSN:
    0170-4214
    Keywords:
    Engineering ; Numerical Methods and Modeling
    Source:
    Wiley InterScience Backfile Collection 1832-2000
    Topics:
    Mathematics
    Notes:
    In this paper a time-discrete dynamic model for the process of disarmament is investigated. The state variables of the system are costs and security values. We assume that the costs can be controlled, and we aim at reducing the costs to zero and achieving non-negative security values after a finite number of time steps. In the case where the opponents behave cooperatively this leads to the solution of a linear programming problem. If the opponents behave non-cooperatively, then a Nash equilibrium has to be determined under linear constraints. © 1997 by B. G. Teubner Stuttgart-John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Math. Meth. Appl. Sci., Vol. 20, 653-666 (1997).
    Additional Material:
    7 Ill.
    Type of Medium:
    Electronic Resource
    Articles: DFG German National Licenses