Search Results - (Author, Cooperation:Lenk, Hans)

Lenk, Hans; Ropohl, Günter

Unknown

373 S.

2., rev. und erw. Aufl.

3-15-008395-8

Lenk, Hans

Unknown

413 S.

3-15-008698-1

Lenk, Hans

Unknown

Lenk, Hans

Unknown

165 S.

Ethik der Wissenschaften Bd. 3

0165-0106

Philosophy

0165-0106

Philosophy

EPISTEMOLOGY, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: Essays in Honour of Carl G. Hempel on the Occasion of His 80th Birthday, January 8th 1985

0044-3301

Philosophy

0044-3301

Philosophy

1572-8420

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Philosophy

Electronic Resource

1572-8420

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Philosophy

Electronic Resource

1572-8587

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Philosophy

Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science

Summary The new so-called pragmatic-epistemic approach to the methodology of explanation seems to dispense with the difference between traditional epistemic reasoning and genuine explanation. Causal explanations are excluded from the debate. Instead, the degree and value of subjective conviction seems to be the decisive factor for explanation. The paper criticizes this restrictive approach for methodological and terminological reasons without denying the importance of epistemic, pragmatic considerations. In addition, the respective traditional thesis on the logical-structural identity of prediction and explanation and the new epistemic turn with respect to this thesis are criticized. The latter seems to lead to confrontations between every day and scientific explanations. The epistemic liberalisation of terminology and methodology certainly admits of new forms of systematization, e.g. potential prediction, but a general theory of systematization should not be too restrictive and should at the same time retain the classical distinction between epistemic and genuine lawful explanations.

Electronic Resource

1572-8587

G. Abel ; Nietzsche ; Goodman ; Putnam ; Interpretation ; Interpretationsabhängigkeit ; Grundsatz der Interpretationsimprägniertheit ; transzendentaler/methodologischer Interpretationismus ; pragmatischer Konstitutionsinterpretationismus

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Philosophy

Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science

Summary Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, there is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level.

Electronic Resource

1432-1904

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Biology

Chemistry and Pharmacology

Natural Sciences in General

Electronic Resource

1436-5073

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Chemistry and Pharmacology

Summary A chromatographic method is described in which degreased yarn threads-wound around a glass frame — instead of thin-layer chromatography plates-paper strips or something similar are dipped into the solvent. In this arrange, ment 0,08μg of Fast Red E and Indigotin I, respectively, could be well separated by the solvent systemn-propanol∶ethyl acetate∶water=6∶1∶3.

Zusammenfassung Eine chromatographische Methode wird beschrieben, bei der anstelle von Dünnschichtplatten, Papierstreifen o. ä. entfettete Garnfäden—auf einen Glasrahmen gewickelt — in das Fließmittel eingetaucht werden. Mit dieser Anordnung konnten noch je 0,08μg Echtrot E und Indigotin I durch das Fließmittel n-Propanol∶Aethylacetat∶Wasser=6∶1∶3 gut getrennt werden.

Electronic Resource

0040-5833

Sociology

Economics

0040-5833

Sociology

Economics

0040-5833

Sociology

Economics

1573-7187

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Sociology

Economics

Abstract This discussion of some aspects of the problem of conditional normative statements, conditional obligations, or commitments will first focus on some well-known pseudo-paradoxes, then state some different ways of symbolizing conditioned norm statements and, finally, end up with a remark concerning von Wright's interpretation of commitments by means of a logic of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Electronic Resource

1573-7187

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Sociology

Economics

Abstract If we understand social psychology to be an area where sociology and psychology overlap, or more precisely where we try to explain interaction on the basis of psychological and sociological propositions and concepts, we have singled out a field that should be quite challenging not only in theory and method but in the fundamental questions it raises for both sociology and psychology. Actually, the discipline is not that well integrated and is constituted by such disparate approaches as reinforcement theory, field theory, role theory, small group theory, game theory and psychoanalysis. Many sociologists have abandoned the field altogether. Nor have the proponents of these sub-fields made much effort to consolidate, integrate or reconcile their methodologies. Epistemological questions have been notably absent and only now have arguments from the philosophy of science point of view reemerged to revive the critical and potentially fruitful methodological discussions of earlier theorists (F. Allport; Lewin; Mead; Simmel) and their more recent followers (Homans; Malewski). After considering epistemological problems dealing with the generality of theory and explanation, behavioristic vs. action approaches, operational and model structural implications, we want to argue for a better understanding of social system variables besides those of the personality system and of system theory in general. In our discussion we use examples from the area of sport because it composes a complex system, that is not too difficult to observe at the same time that it shows in relative clarity all of the different levels of an action system. It has, furthermore, many features of an almost experimental design in a natural field. In so far it is a model area to allow due consideration for our demand that social psychology rediscover the method of field studies. This will help to reverse the trend characterized by a general neglect of theory that has resulted from behavioral dogmatism and the expedience of research pragmatism based mostly on two-variable linear models. This is not to say that we disfavor rigorous research design and data analysis - to the contrary. We just want it to be done in the context of broader theoretical concerns and in clear recognition of the pitfalls of operationalism and the merits of action theory.

Electronic Resource

1573-1103

Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Philosophy

Electronic Resource